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The Unbearable Licence of Being the
Executive: A Response to Stacey’s
Permanent Environmental Emergency
BRUCE PARDY*
This article responds to Jocelyn Stacey’s “The Environmental Emergency and the Legality of
Discretion in Environmental Law.” In her article, Stacey attempts to establish the legitimacy
of unfettered executive discretion to deal with environmental issues, but the justification that
she provides is not up to the task. She asserts that all environmental issues are emergencies,
but she does not explain why they are so. She proposes to resolve the problem of executive
discretion by redefining the rule of law, thereby rendering it an empty shell. Environmental
protection and the rule of law do not push in opposite directions. Instead, it is the loss of the
rule of law that allows governments to pick and choose the environmental conditions that
they wish alternatively to save and sacrifice. The solution to environmental issues that the
rule of law demands is not unfettered discretion but better abstraction in rules of general
application. Boundless authority to respond to “environmental emergency” is an unbearable
licence to make things up on the go.
Cet article répond à celui de Jocelyn Stacey : « L’urgence environnementale et la légitimité
du pouvoir discrétionnaire dans les lois sur l’environnement ». Dans son article, Stacey
tente d’établir la légitimité d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire sans entrave dans le traitement des
problèmes de l’environnement, mais la justification qu’elle apporte est boiteuse. Elle affirme
que tous les problèmes environnementaux constituent des urgences, mais n’explique pas
pourquoi. Elle propose de résoudre le problème d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire en redéfinissant
la primauté du droit, ce qui en fait une coquille vide. La protection de l’environnement et la
primauté du droit ne sont en aucun cas incompatibles. C’est au contraire la perte de la primauté
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du droit qui permet aux gouvernements de déterminer quelles situations environnementales
il convient de sauvegarder et lesquelles il convient de sacrifier. La solution des problèmes
environnementaux qu’exige la primauté du droit n’est pas un pouvoir discrétionnaire sans
entrave, mais une meilleure abstraction des lois dans leur application. Un pouvoir illimité de
répondre à des « urgences environnementales » constitue une insoutenable liberté de traiter
les choses sur le pouce.
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In every age the men who want us under their thumb, if they have any sense, will
put forward the particular pretension which the hopes and fears of that age render
most potent. … It has been magic, it has been Christianity. Now it will certainly be
science. … Let us not be deceived by phrases about “Man taking charge of his own
destiny.” All that can really happen is that some men will take charge of the destiny
of others. … The more completely we are planned the more powerful they will be.
—C. S. Lewis, God in the Dock1
IT IS EIGHT HUNDRED YEARS since the Magna Carta, and one of the main

projects of environmental law academics seems to be to tear down the concept
that it helped establish. That concept is the rule of law: the proposition that
no office or officers are above the law or empowered to make it up as they go.
In her article “The Environmental Emergency and the Legality of Discretion
in Environmental Law,”2 Jocelyn Stacey joins the chorus proposing to throw
out rule of law norms in the name of environmental protection. She advocates
carte blanche for government officials dealing with environmental issues—and
assumes that they will act for the purposes that she has in mind.
1.

2.

CS Lewis, God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics (Grand Rapids, Mich: Eeerdmans,
1972), cited in David J Theroux, “C.S. Lewis on Tyranny ‘for the Good’ of Its Victims”
(29 January 2009), The Beacon (blog), online: <blog.independent.org/2009/01/29/
tyranny-for-the-good-of-its-victims>.
(2016) 52:3 Osgoode Hall LJ [page 985].
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In a nutshell, Stacey makes two main arguments. First, she says that all
environmental issues are emergencies, and therefore the executive branch of
government should have free rein to deal with them. Second, she argues that
unfettered executive discretion does not violate the rule of law because the rule
of law can be redefined.
Stacey’s underlying theme is well-trodden: Variability and unpredictability
in ecosystems pose challenges to environmental governance. These challenges
are said to require “adaptive management,” which consists of particularized,
context-specific measures.3 Environmental managers use their unfettered
discretion to craft trial-and-error prescriptions on an ongoing basis in each specific
ecosystem context. These managers are government officials and thus members of
the executive branch exercising the authority of the Crown. Executive discretion
is necessary because the public good depends on it; and the public good depends
on it because it is necessary.
I have argued elsewhere that this reasoning is flawed.4 I will not repeat these
objections here other than in the course of commenting on Stacey’s two main
propositions, namely that discretion is justified because environmental issues are
emergencies and that such discretion is consistent with a reconceived rule of law.
Stacey tries to make her case in part by contrasting it with the “environmental
reform position,” which objects to the discretionary nature of environmental law.
I am one of the reformers that Stacey quotes in her article (although there is no
such singular position or school of thought, and I would not have used that label).
Stacey, to her credit, at least acknowledges that unsupervised, discretionary
executive power requires justification. Indeed, that is the purpose of her article,
3.

4.

See Eric Biber, “Adaptive Management and the Future of Environmental Law” (2013)
46:4 Akron L Rev 933; Martin ZP Olszynski, “Adaptive Management in Canadian
Environmental Assessment Law: Exploring Uses and Limitations” (2010) 21 J Envtl L &
Prac 1; B Pardy, “The Pardy-Ruhl Dialogue on Ecosystem Management Part V: Discretion,
Complex-Adaptive Problem Solving and the Rule of Law” (2008) 25:2 Pace Envtl L Rev
341 [Pardy, “Ecosystem Management Part V”]; JB Ruhl, “The Pardy-Ruhl Dialogue on
Ecosystem Management, Part IV: Narrowing and Sharpening the Questions” (2007) 24:1
Pace Envtl LR 25; B Pardy, “Ten Myths of Ecosystem Management” (2009) 39:10 Envtl
L Rep 10917; JB Ruhl, “It’s Time to Learn to Live With Adaptive Management (Because
We Don’t Have a Choice)” (2009) 39:10 Envtl L Rep 10920; Oliver A Houck, “Nature
or Nurture: What’s Wrong and What’s Right With Adaptive Management” (2009) 39:10
Envtl L Rep 10923.
Bruce Pardy, “In Search of the Holy Grail of Environmental Law: A Rule to Solve the
Problem” (2005) 1:1 JSDLP 29 [Pardy, “In Search of the Holy Grail of Environmental
Law”]; Bruce Pardy,“Ecosystem Management in Question: A Reply to Ruhl” (2006) 23:1
Pace Envtl L Rev 201; Pardy, “Ecosystem Management Part V,” supra note 3.
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and her thesis is directed at establishing its legitimacy. However, the justification
that she actually provides is not up to the task. She asserts that environmental
problems are emergencies, but she does not explain why they are so. She argues
that the conflict between executive discretion and the rule of law can be resolved
by redefining the rule of law, thus removing the essence of what it means and
rendering it an empty shell.

I. EVERYTHING IS AN EMERGENCY
A. THE EXECUTIVE’S EMERGENCY PREROGATIVE

Before considering Stacey’s proposition that all environmental events are
emergencies, it is first necessary to provide some context. Emergency is a legal
term of art and carries legal consequences. At common law, the Crown has the
prerogative to act in times of emergency where the existence or sovereignty of the
country is threatened.5 In Canada, federal statutes such as the National Defence
Act6 and the Emergencies Act7 now regulate matters that might have fallen within
such a Crown prerogative.8 Where the matter is dealt with by statute, it displaces
the prerogative, and the executive must act in accordance with the statute.9 In
either case, whether there is a statute providing for the power or whether the
Crown is exercising its common law prerogative in the absence of a statute, courts
may determine whether such an emergency exists, and thus have jurisdiction to
determine whether the power applies in particular situations and whether the
Crown has acted within those powers.10 As Peter Hogg points out, the prerogative

5.

Patrick J Monahan & Byron Shaw, Constitutional Law, 4th ed (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2013) at 60, citing Burmah Oil Co (Burmah Trading) Ltd v Lord Advocate, [1964] UKHL
6, [1965] AC 75. According to that case, “[T]he Crown enjoys the right to take actions
in an emergency that are necessary in order to defend the sovereignty of the country.”
See also Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed, vol 1 (Toronto: Carswell,
2007) at 1-18-1-21.
6. RSC 1985, c N-5.
7. RSC 1985, c 22 (4th Supp).
8. Monahan & Shaw, supra note 5.
9. The courts have held that where a prerogative power has been regulated or defined by statute,
statute displaces the prerogative and the Crown must act on the basis of the statutorily
defined powers. See Monahan & Shaw, supra note 5; Hogg, supra note 5 at 1-20.
10. Case of Proclamations, [1610] EWHC KB J22, 77 ER 1352; The Auckland Harbour Board
v The King (New Zealand), [1923] UKPC 92, [1924] AC 318; Entick v Carrington, [1765]
EWHC KB J98, 95 ER 807.
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is a creature of the common law because “it is the decisions of the courts which
have determined its existence and extent.”11
Stacey relies in her article on Carl Schmitt’s concept of an emergency.
In Schmitt’s view, the sovereign has the power not merely to act in times of
emergency but to decide when an emergency exists and the extent of the powers it
may exercise to respond. In his book Political Theology written in 1922, he wrote:
For a legal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign
who definitely decides whether this normal situation actually exists. … He has
the monopoly over this last decision. Therein resides the essence of the state’s
sovereignty, which must be juristically defined correctly, not as the monopoly to
coerce or to rule, but as the monopoly to decide. The exception reveals most clearly
the essence of the state’s authority. The decision parts here from the legal norm, and
(to formulate it paradoxically) authority proves that to produce law it need not be
based on law.12

This power lies outside the law and is not subject to review in the courts. It
is not compliant with rule of law norms, but it does not need to be, according to
Schmitt, since it is prior to or external to the existing legal order.
Schmitt’s view of sovereign power in an emergency is more extreme than
Canadian law presently reflects. David Dyzenhaus is one of Schmitt’s critics.
He has challenged Schmitt’s proposition that the executive can be said to have a
monopoly over emergencies,13 with the power not merely to act but also to decide
when an emergency exists and the boundaries of the powers that the emergency
justifies. Dyzenhaus writes:
[T]here is no prerogative attaching to any institution of state to act outside of the
law. … [I]f the executive is given the equivalent of such a prerogative either by
the constitution or by statute, it is the duty of judges to try to understand that
delegation of power as constrained by the rule of law.14
[…]

11. Supra note 5 at 1-18, n 85, citing Case of Proclamations, supra note 10 (stating that “the King
hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the land allows him”).
12. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, translated by
George Schwab (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1985) at 13, cited in David Dyzenhaus,
“Schmitt v Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal Order?” (2006) 27:5
Cardozo L Rev 2005 at 2005 [Dyzenhaus, “Schmitt v Dicey”].
13. Dyzenhaus asks, “Is there a ‘strength inherent within’ the rule of law such that emergencies
do not require that we make exceptions to it? I like to think that the answer to this question
is ‘yes.’” David Dyzenhaus, “Introduction: Legality in a Time of Emergency” (2008) 24
Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 1 at 1 [citations omitted] [Dyzenhaus, “Introduction”].
14. Dyzenhaus, “Schmitt v Dicey,” supra note 12 at 2010-11.
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Not only is it the case that it is for the court to decide whether the government has
a justified claim that there is an emergency—the first limb—but the courts must
assess whether the actual responses to the emergency are legal—the second limb.15

B. THE MEANING OF EMERGENCY

An emergency in the Schmittian sense is an unanticipated existential threat or
a threat to the sovereignty of the country.16 Stacey acknowledges this, but she
suggests that threats need not be so extreme and maintains that constitutional
law scholars have relaxed the threshold for what constitutes an emergency in
the post-9/11 era.17 Instead, Stacey says that merely serious threats will suffice as
emergencies. She reasons:
Where the state faces a truly existential threat, Schmitt argues that the sovereign (or
the modern-day executive) may need to suspend legal order altogether, but the fact
that the sovereign is so empowered reveals that it is in the position to respond the
most expeditiously to serious, though not existential, threats.18

If Schmitt is right that the sovereign has the power to define when an
emergency exists, which is a power that lies outside the law and is not subject
to review by the courts, then an emergency exists whenever the sovereign says
that it does even if the threat is not actually existential or extreme. Stacey says
that, therefore, merely serious threats will suffice as emergencies. If the sovereign
has the power that Schmitt describes, then Stacey must surely be correct. But
the logic does not draw a line at serious threats. If the sovereign has the power
15. Ibid at 2009. See also Dyzenhaus, “Introduction,” supra note 13 at 3 [citations omitted].
Dyzenhaus writes:
The view for which I argue takes its cue from the dissents in the infamous cases. It insists that
the long term interests of the rule of law require judges to uphold a robust set of principles
during an emergency, principles which do not allow judges to abdicate responsibility. This view
does seem to have some support in the recent judicial record, in such United States Supreme
Court’s decisions as Hamdan v Rumsfeld, in the Belmarsh decision of the House of Lords, and
in the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in Charkaoui.

16. Schmitt, supra note 12 at 6.
17. Supra note 2 at 990, n 26. Stacey writes:
If anything, constitutional law scholars have relaxed the threshold for what constitutes an
emergency. Schmitt focused on a truly existential threat, but the prevalence of Schmitt’s
challenge in the post-9/11 literature suggests that something less than an existential threat can
constitute an emergency, given that, as dramatic as terror attacks of the last two decades have
been, they have not been existential threats.

18. Ibid at 989.
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to define emergency, then it is not even necessary that the situation be serious.
Indeed, there is no point in establishing criteria at all. Under Schmitt’s logic,
any situation declared by the sovereign to be an emergency will indeed be an
emergency since the sovereign’s decision lies outside the law and is not reviewable.
If you are Henry VIII, the inability to obtain a divorce will be an emergency. Off
with her head.
If one accepts Schmitt’s core proposition, the rest of Stacey’s argument is
unnecessary. If the executive stands outside the law in an emergency and can
define when the emergency exists without accountability, then there is no useful
purpose to be served by defining or describing the law of emergencies, including
whether environmental issues fall within the legal definition. There is no role for
a legal definition since the power lies outside the law. Environmental issues are
emergencies if the executive says so; if it does not, they are not.
On the other hand, if one accepts Dyzenhaus’s proposition that the Crown’s
prerogative must be subject to judicial review, then there are legal issues to
discuss. What is the legal meaning of emergency? Is it wide enough to include all
environmental issues?
C. ALL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ARE EMERGENCIES?

Stacey says all environmental events should be viewed as emergencies, and
therefore they justify unfettered discretion. She explains that all environmental
issues are emergencies because:
Our understanding of ecological systems as complex, adaptive systems means
that the epistemic features of emergencies are inherent within all environmental
issues. While it is certainly not the case that all environmental issues contain the
possibility of an extreme event or catastrophe, our inability to distinguish in advance
the ones that contain this possibility from the ones that do not justifies viewing
all environmental issues from this perspective. It is not possible to “carve out
irreversible or catastrophic risks for special treatment,” since … we cannot reliably
identify these in advance. … [E]ach environmental issue can be understood as an
“emergency in miniature” … . It is our epistemic inability to distinguish benign
from catastrophic policy choices that justifies viewing all relevant events and policies
through the prism of the emergency paradigm.19

In essence, Stacey invokes the “butterfly effect”: We cannot know the causal
chain to which a butterfly’s wings contribute. The consequences are probably
benign, but they might be catastrophic. Therefore, a butterfly flapping its wings
must be seen through the prism of the emergency paradigm. Stacey insists that all
19. Ibid at 994.
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environmental events and policies should be viewed in this way. That means that
the very existence of ecosystems must be seen as having the epistemic features
of an emergency. Essentially she argues that the state of the natural world is
incompatible with the rule of law.
Ecosystems are patterns of interactions between organisms and their
non-living environment. They do not exist independently of those interactions.
Each interaction contributes to the dynamics that make the system what it is.
Ecosystems change through time as a result of the cumulative effects of the
interactions in the system. The rate of change is usually slow but sometimes
dramatic; sometimes human activities influence it, but change also occurs in the
absence of human effects. The mere occurrence of change in an ecosystem is not
evidence of something ‘wrong.’
The unpredictability of ecosystems is not a threat to ecosystems. If the
objective of environmental law was to let ecosystems be ecosystems, then change
in ecosystems would not be necessarily perceived as problematic. However, the
prevailing ideology in environmental law is ecosystem management. The objective
of ecosystem management is to control and manage ecosystems to produce
desirable outcomes. Variability and unpredictability in ecosystems stand in the
way of such management. If your mandate is to manage ecosystems and they
cannot be managed, that will seem like an emergency. The nature of ecosystems
is incompatible with the aspirations of those who wish to manage them, but it
is not incompatible with the requirements of the rule of law. The management
imperative does not arise from variability and unpredictability in ecosystems but
from the culture of the administrative state, which exists to manage, facilitate,
and control the attributes of modern civilization.
What are the criteria, according to Stacey, for catastrophic environmental
situations? When does an actual emergency occur? She uses the mountain pine
beetle epidemic in Western Canada as her main example. I will reproduce her
description of the epidemic at length because what she says is important and
what she does not say is even more important.
One example of the complex, adaptive nature of ecosystems and their potential for
an unknown, extreme event is the ongoing unprecedented mountain pine beetle
epidemic in Western Canada. It is the second largest insect epidemic in North
American history. The beetle has decimated the lodgepole pine population across
the province of British Columbia. At times, the beetles travelled in such density that
they could be seen as a light drizzle on weather radar and “fell like rain out of the sky.”
The mountain pine beetle now covers an unprecedented range, extending well into
the neighbouring province of Alberta. Moreover, having overrun its historic host,
the beetle has begun to attack new species for the first time, making the entire pan-
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Canadian boreal forest susceptible to attack. The epidemic is a natural disaster, albeit
an unconventional one, analogized by one author to a slow-moving tsunami. The
epidemic will wreak havoc on the British Columbia forest industry, the province’s
primary natural resource industry. It has killed vast areas of forest in the interior of
British Columbia, turning the landscape red, then grey, as the attacked trees die.
The result has been a short-term boom of available timber that needs to be logged
before it rots. Even still, the beetle is out-logging the loggers, meaning that around
half of all lodgepole pine, deliberately managed for long-term harvesting, will not be
available for harvest in ten- to fifty-years’ time. … Mountain pine beetle outbreaks
are a regular occurrence in forests dominated by lodgepole pine, to be sure. But not
on this scale. Although we now know that the combination of fire suppression and
climate change were the main drivers of the epidemic, the complexity of ecological
relationships made it extremely difficult to know in advance how disparate forest
management decisions could have an impact upon the beetle’s long-term population
dynamics let alone predict how those decisions would intersect with the then
undiscovered phenomenon of climate change. Moreover, the ongoing dynamics of
the beetle continue to defy prediction. “[T]he pine beetle did everything the experts
said it couldn’t do: it flew over mountains, it invaded northern forests, it attacked
spruce trees, and it wiped out pine plantations not much thicker in diameter than
baseball bats.”20

The solution to environmental issues that the rule of law demands is not
unfettered discretion but better abstraction in rules of general application. Stacey
says the pine beetle is an environmental problem and therefore an emergency, but
only with reference to facts specific to the situation. What she does not provide, and
what the rule of law requires, is an explanation of why it constitutes a problem in
abstract legal terms. Why is the presence of the beetle an environmental problem?
Why is it ‘wrong’? Stacey’s tale of the beetle alludes to multiple rationales all
jumbled together without identifying what those rationales are or upon which
of them she is basing her conclusion. Stacey needs to finish this sentence: “The
mountain pine beetle is an environmental problem because … .”
The first step in answering this question is to choose between the following
options, which rely on different values, premises, and reasoning:
1. Because it is consuming a resource that is valuable to humans. (“The
epidemic will wreak havoc on the British Columbia forest industry,
the province’s primary natural resource industry. It has killed
vast areas of forest in the interior of British Columbia, turning
the landscape red, then grey, as the attacked trees die. The result
has been a short-term boom of available timber that needs to
be logged before it rots. Even still, the beetle is out-logging the
20. Ibid at 993.
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2.

3.

4.

5.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

loggers, meaning that around half of all lodgepole pine, deliberately
managed for long-term harvesting, will not be available for harvest
in ten- to fifty-years’ time.”21)
Because it is ‘abnormal’; that is, not in accordance with recorded events
over time in that ecosystem. The beetle is an invasive species that does
not ‘belong’ in this ecosystem. (“The mountain pine beetle now covers
an unprecedented range, extending well into the neighbouring
province of Alberta. … Moreover, the ongoing dynamics of the
beetle continue to defy prediction. ‘[T]he pine beetle did everything
the experts said it couldn’t do: it flew over mountains, it invaded
northern forests …’ .”22) On the other hand, insect infestations
sometimes happen in ecosystems. They can be natural. (“Mountain
pine beetle outbreaks are a regular occurrence in forests dominated
by lodgepole pine … .”23)
Because it is causing the forest ecosystems to undergo transformative
change. (“Extreme events—such as large hurricanes, earthquakes,
or pest outbreaks [all natural phenomena]—occur with surprising
frequency and can disrupt the system such that it does not return to
its prior state.”24) This conclusion implies that the only non-emergency
state is a steady state, which is a state that does not exist in nature.
Because the presence of the beetle is a product of human action. (“[T]he
combination of fire suppression and climate change were the main
drivers of the epidemic … .”25) If this is the rationale, then the same
event without human cause would lead to a different conclusion and
would be neither an environmental problem nor an emergency.
Because the infestation is contrary to human aesthetic sensibilities. (“At
times, the beetles travelled in such density that they could be seen as
a light drizzle on weather radar and “fell like rain out of the sky.”26)
If so, the definition of environmental problem has nothing to do with
ecosystem function or economic or natural resources.

Ibid at 992.
Ibid at 993
Ibid at 992.
Ibid at 991.
Ibid at 992.
Ibid at 991.
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6. Because the infestation constitutes an existential threat. But to what
does it represent an existential threat? Not to the sovereign state. Not
to the ecosystem.
Which of these features of the beetle infestation is Stacey concerned
about? She does not say. Identifying one of them is the first step in a process
of reasoning and abstraction that would explain the conclusion. What will
not do is a blanket conclusion that the presence of the pine beetle is simply
“undesirable.” Undesirability is not a basis for the exercise of executive discretion
and is certainly not a justification for emergency powers. Stacey declines to do
what environmental managers generally decline to do: to define in abstract
legal terms her definition of an environmental problem that would constitute
an emergency. She can provide any criteria she wishes as long as those criteria
govern all abstractly similar situations. Characterizing environmental problems
as emergencies without providing binding criteria allows different values to be
applied to different scenarios at different times by different officials. In short, it
provides licence for arbitrary governance.
Ecosystems are wild. They are unpredictable. Managing them changes
them from what they are and what they would have become had they not been
managed. If wildfires threaten the lives of people, call it an emergency and
bring out the troops. But natural phenomena that have unpredictable effects on
ecosystems are not emergencies for ecosystems. The beetle is only an emergency
if one has already accepted the premise of ecosystem management, namely that it
is the role of government to oversee the state of ecosystems. That premise stands
in opposition to what ecosystems are and how they work.
Stacey objects to the concept of rules because language contains inherent
ambiguities. She dismisses my argument from an earlier article27 that
environmental law should consist of generally applicable abstract rules:
Pardy’s proposal, while considerably more elegant than the current tangle of
prohibitions, qualifiers, and exemptions found in Canadian environmental law,
simply embeds discretionary judgment calls within its open-textured language. What
constitutes non-natural, permanent, or even an ecosystem is a highly contextual and
often contentious determination. Under a general environmental rule, discretion
would not be eliminated or minimized, merely shuffled around. Schmitt’s challenge
cannot be met by simply making fewer, simpler, or better ex ante rules. But to see
that this solution is inadequate, environmental law has to own up its unavoidable
subjection to Schmitt’s challenge in the first place.28

27. Pardy, “In Search of the Holy Grail of Environmental Law,” supra note 4.
28. Supra note 2 at 1012.
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This is a cop-out. For a time, one of my colleagues had a cartoon on her door
that showed a professor lying on a psychiatrist’s couch with the shrink sitting
nearby taking notes. The caption read, “I think I’ve lost the will to footnote.”
Stacey has lost the will to abstract. Abstraction means finding the rule, principle,
or reason that is broader than the specific case. If Kate pushes Gary out of the way
to get the last seat on the bus, Kate commits the tort of battery. If Hugh throws a
rock at Joan and hits her in the head, Hugh commits a battery. In both situations,
the same abstract action has occurred: Both Kate and Hugh made intentional
contact with another in the absence of consent.
Language does contain inherent ambiguities, but making this objection to
avoid abstract rules is to throw the baby out with the bathwater. It may not be
possible to articulate a rule that always clearly resolves all sets of facts.29 However,
it is eminently possible to define rules that resolve the vast majority of applicable
cases and provide bright line boundaries that remove the ability of officials to
make things up as they go. Language can contain ambiguities, but it can also
contain meaning. Because courts have defined battery as an intentional contact
without consent, we know that Hugh commits a battery when he throws a rock
at Joan and hits her in the head. We also know that if Raffi trips over a briefcase
that Wilma accidentally left under the chair, Wilma has not committed a battery.
Statutes contain rules expressed in words. The meaning of those words may
not be completely clear when a court applies them to the case before it. However,
a court’s interpretation of those words gives them meaning. Because the court
functions within a system of precedent, the words are less ambiguous after the
case than they were before it. It is not correct to say that the next court has
unbridled discretion to decide the outcome of the next case. In contrast, executive
officials are not bound by other decisions of other officials. Their decisions do not
define anything for the purpose of the next decision. If all that exists is discretion,
it is impossible to know where you stand until the bureaucrat exercises her fiat.
It is one thing to note the challenges posed by the ambiguity of language. It is
quite another to wildly extrapolate from that modest proposition to abandon the
enterprise of expressing rules and reasons that limit the power of those who govern.
By that reasoning, no rules of any kind are possible, no laws exist, and everything
in the world is an emergency and subject to unfettered executive discretion.

29. See Richard A Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 1997) at 53. Epstein observes that “no set of rules will be perfect in
its application; indeed, knowing when to quit is one of the driving forces behind a set
of simple rules.”
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Creating sound abstract rules is hard work. They need to be sufficiently
abstract to apply to a wide range of circumstances and sufficiently concrete to
define the line between legal and illegal. Such rules are challenging to draft.
Legislatures require political courage to enact them because they state the rule
ahead of time, committing the executive to a course of action before anyone
knows the political context of disputes that have not yet arisen.

II. UNFETTERED DISCRETION AND THE RULE OF LAW
A. HAVING IT BOTH WAYS

Stacey’s second main argument is puzzling and seems like an afterthought.
After spending three-quarters of her article arguing that environmental issues
require unfettered discretion, she then proposes that a different conception of
the rule of law can and should constrain that discretion. These two arguments
conflict. Stacey makes her first claim emphatically: The nature of environmental
events requires discretion that is unconstrained, a term she uses repeatedly,
emphasizing the necessity for, well, lack of constraint. She then maintains that
unfettered executive discretion does not violate the rule of law if the rule of law
is redefined—because her reconstituted rule of law meaningfully constrains
executive discretion.
Both claims cannot be satisfied. If her new rule of law does constrain the
exercise of discretion, then that discretion is not unconstrained, as she claims
it needs to be. If her new rule of law does not constrain that discretion, then
discretion is not constrained as she claims it would be. Essentially, she argues
that unconstrained executive discretion is legitimate because it is constrained. Yet
she does not want the now-constrained unconstrained discretion to be subject to
a formal rule of law because that would actually constrain it. By the end of the
article, it is difficult to discern whether Stacey believes in constraint or not.
Furthermore, by the conclusion Stacey has left the realm of emergency. She
began with Schmitt but seems to have abandoned him. Schmitt maintained that
emergency executive powers stand outside the law and are not subject to supervision
from either legislature or courts. In contrast, Stacey ends up addressing a far more
ordinary question: Where a statute authorizes administrative discretion, to what
extent do courts limit that discretion upon judicial review? It is not clear in what
way Schmitt is a necessary element of Stacey’s thesis.
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B. BLACK IS WHITE

Stacey acknowledges the conflict between the rule of law and the broad licence she
proposes to grant to the executive: “[E]nvironmental issues pose a fundamental
challenge for the rule of law: They reveal the necessity of unconstrained executive
discretion.”30 Black is not white.
But then she suggests that the conflict can be resolved simply by redefining
what the rule of law means. She proposes “an alternative understanding of
the rule of law, one that accounts for the inevitability and the desirability of
administrative discretion … [and] significant institutional innovation across a
broad range of administrative contexts to ensure that the requirement of public
justification can be fulfilled.”31
Black could be white after all. Stacey engages in a process of doublethink
that would make George Orwell spin in his grave.32 Rather than confront the
problem that unfettered executive discretion poses to a system of law built on
separation of powers and legislative supervision of the executive branch, Stacey
dismisses these norms as part of an old-fashioned, formalistic rule of law and
declares the problem solved. She says that “an alternative conception of the rule
of law can both constitute and constrain the state’s regulative authority over
the environment.”33 She refers to both common law reasoning34 and common

30. Supra note 2 at 983.
31. Ibid at 1016.
32. Nineteen Eighty-Four (London: Penguin Books, 1949) at 37-38. Orwell writes:
To know and not to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while telling carefully
constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two opinions which cancelled out, knowing them
to be contradictory and believing in both of them, to use logic against logic, to repudiate
morality while laying claim to it, to believe that democracy was impossible and that the
Party was the guardian of democracy, to forget whatever it was necessary to forget, then to
draw it back into memory again at the moment when it was needed, and then promptly to
forget it again: and above all, to apply the same process to the process itself. That was the
ultimate subtlety: consciously to induce unconsciousness, and then, once again, to become
unconscious of the act of hypnosis you had just performed. Even to understand the word
‘doublethink’ involved the use of doublethink.
33. Supra note 2 at 983.
34. Stacey writes, “This article advances an understanding of the rule of law—one built on
common law reasoning—that is capable of providing meaningful legal constraints on
environmental decision making” (ibid at 985).
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law constitutionalism35 as the source of these restraints. However, the article is
bereft of explanation as to how either or both mean that unconstrained executive
discretion is consistent with the rule of law. It is not even clear whether she means
the same thing or different things when she refers to “common law reasoning”
and “common law constitutionalism.”
Common law reasoning is based on precedent. A system of precedent means
that reasons in previous cases must be honoured in the next case; otherwise there
is no law but merely random decisions by isolated judges. A system of precedent
requires abstraction. When Oliver Wendell Holmes famously said that the life
of the common law has not been logic but experience,36 he did not mean that
that it is devoid of abstract reasoning or that each case is an isolated event. The
common law judge must apply the law, and the law is determined by interpreting
previous cases to discern the abstract rules and principles that the results and
reasons in those cases express. Common law reasoning is incompatible with
unrestrained discretion.
Stacey suggests that the theory of common law constitutionalism interprets
legal constraints as constraints of “adequate justification”37 and requires that
public officials “justify their decisions on the basis of fundamental constitutional
principles.”38 She provides little else to explain what that means other than to
seize upon the idea of public justification, which she equates with the production
of reasons. However, administrative officials give reasons only in extremely
limited circumstances such as when they are adjudicating rights.39 Within the
vast institutional machinery of environmental and land-use administration at
multiple levels of government, reasons are rare. Even when officials provide them,
they do not do so within a system of precedent. Stacey’s statement that reasons
“ensure that the individual knows that he or she has not been treated arbitrarily
by the state”40 is an odd claim, which would only be true if those reasons were
35. Stacey writes:
Stacey writes: [C]ommon law constitutionalism … understands rule-of-law constraints as ‘the
constraints of adequate justification.’ Common law constitutionalism suggests that creative
institutional design can allow all public decisions to be subject to meaningful rule-of-law
constraints, even in the highly complex and unpredictable context of the environmental
emergency (ibid at 987-988]).

36.
37.
38.
39.

Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, The Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1881) at 1.
Supra note 2 at 1016.
Ibid.
See e.g. Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817, 174
DLR (4th) 193. Stacey refers to this Supreme Court of Canada case in her article.
40. Supra note 2 at 1018.
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binding. Since administrative officers are not bound in this way, reasons are as
likely to show that the decision was inconsistent with previous decisions made
by other officers and was therefore arbitrary. In other words, even in the rare
situation where reasons are forthcoming, they provide little protection from
arbitrary measures if they do not constitute law that must be applied to the next
case. This version of “public justification” bears little resemblance to common law
reasoning or common law constitutionalism.41
C. SEPARATION OF POWERS

Stacey rejects the notion of separation of powers since it gets in the way of officials
seeking to achieve higher goals. “Like any institutional design,” she writes,
separation of powers “is only useful to the extent that it enables the realization of
foundational constitutional principles.”42 The statement is almost amusing since
there are few legal principles more foundational than the separation of powers.
The Supreme Court of Canada has observed that the separation of powers is a
fundamental principle of the Canadian Constitution.43 In Ontario v Criminal
Lawyers’ Association of Ontario, the Court stated:

41. Indeed, common law constitutionalism supports the position Stacey dismisses. She rejects
features of the environmental reform position that are congruent with three of Lon Fuller’s
eight “principles of legality”—generality, promulgation, and congruence between official
action and declared rule. See Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised ed (New Haven,
Conn: Yale University Press, 1969). Stacey cites David Dyzenhaus extensively in her article,
yet Dyzenhaus approves of Fuller’s approach. See e.g. David Dyzenhaus, “The Legitimacy of
Legality” (1996) 46:1 UTLJ 129.
42. Supra note 2 at 1021.
43. Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court (PEI), [1997] 3 SCR 3 at paras
138-39, 150 DLR (4th) 577 [Reference re Remuneration]; Wells v Newfoundland, [1999] 3
SCR 199 at para 52, 177 DRL (4th) 73 [Wells]; Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of
Education), 2003 SCC 62 at paras 33, 107, [2003] 3 SCR 3; New Brunswick Broadcasting Co
v Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly), [1993] 1 SCR 319 at para 141, 100 DLR
(4th) 212. See also James Johnson, The Separation of Powers and the Delegation of Legislative
Power: Charting Unstable Terrain at the Supreme Court of Canada (PhD Thesis, Queen’s
University, 2015) [unpublished] at 40. Johnson observes:
The constitutional coherence of the [Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence on separation
of powers] ultimately comes from the fact that it energizes the fundamental constitutional
principles of democracy and the rule of law. It encourages and fosters a responsibility for
law-making and policy-making in the most representative institution of government, the
legislature. The executive branch, meanwhile, is given public standards to guide its activities,
and the judiciary has access to a set of legislated norms against which to judge executive action.
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Over several centuries of transformation and conflict, the English system evolved
from one in which power was centralized in the Crown to one in which the powers
of the state were exercised by way of distinct organs with separate functions. The
development of separate executive, legislative and judicial functions has allowed
for the evolution of certain core competencies in the various institutions vested
with these functions. The legislative branch makes policy choices, adopts laws and
holds the purse strings of government, as only it can authorize the spending of
public funds. The executive implements and administers those policy choices and
laws with the assistance of a professional public service. The judiciary maintains
the rule of law, by interpreting and applying these laws through the independent
and impartial adjudication of references and disputes, and protects the fundamental
liberties and freedoms guaranteed under the Charter. All three branches have
distinct institutional capacities and play critical and complementary roles in our
constitutional democracy. However, each branch will be unable to fulfill its role if it
is unduly interfered with by the others.44

Even with the Court’s qualifications that the separation of powers is not
strict45 or absolute46 under the Canadian Constitution, unfettered executive
authority is its antithesis. It is not clear to what other principles Stacey ascribes
a higher priority.
D. THE WRONG STRAW MAN

Stacey argues for her alternative conception of the rule of law by contrasting
it with the status quo—the current conception of the rule of law as applied
by courts (which Stacey refers to as the “formal” rule of law). In so doing, she
purports to respond to arguments of environmental law reformers who decry the
dominance of discretion in environmental law. Stacey writes:
[T]he environmental emergency reveals both the necessity and desirability of
discretion [and] the formal conception of the rule of law is incapable of providing
meaningful constraints on the exercise of that discretion. In other words, the
environmental reform position is right to call attention to the pervasive problem
of discretion in Canadian environmental law since the courts seem beholden to the
formal conception that leads judges to create legal black and grey holes.47

But Stacey’s argument does not respond to the reform position because the
reform position supports reform, not the status quo. My position is not that
44. 2013 SCC 43 at paras 28-29, [2013] 3 SCR 3 [CLA]. See also Fraser v PSSRB, [1985]
2 SCR 455 at para 39, 23 DLR (4th) 122; Reference re Remuneration, supra note 37 at
paras 125, 139.
45. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at para 15, 161 DLR (4th) 385.
46. Wells, supra note 43 at para 54.
47. Supra note 2 at 1011.
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the present state of the “formal” rule of law as observed by legislatures and
courts is adequate. Legislatures do a poor job of reflecting rule of law standards
in environmental statutes,48 and courts enforce requirements of the rule of law
only partially and inconsistently. The Supreme Court of Canada has found that
some rule of law norms but not others form part of the Canadian constitution.49
Dyzenhaus laments that courts create a facade of the rule of law when they approve
of executive action unrestrained by broad statutes, creating “grey holes.”50 Stacey
agrees, and I do too. Black holes and grey holes are not features of a system based
upon a rigorous rule of law. The status quo version of the formal rule of law is
inadequate. Stacey challenges the wrong straw man.
48. David Mullan, Administrative Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 135. Mullan writes, “What
was once generally justified only in time of war or other emergencies has become increasingly
common: the enactment of legislation with very little opportunity for parliamentary debate
and with both the principles and the detail left initially for the executive to work out and also
subject to change at the executive’s whim.”
49. See e.g. CLA, supra note 44; Babcock v Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 57 at para 54,
[2002] 3 SCR 3; Authorson (Litigation Guardian of ) v Canada (Attorney General), 2003 SCC
39, [2003] 2 SCR 40; British Columbia v Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd, 2005 SCC 49 at
paras 58-59, 63-64, [2005] 2 SCR 473, en banc [citations omitted] [Imperial Tobacco]. The
Court in Imperial Tobacco, in a judgment delivered by Justice Major, stated:
This Court has described the rule of law as embracing three principles. The first recognizes
that “the law is supreme over officials of the government as well as private individuals, and
thereby preclusive of the influence of arbitrary power” … . The second “requires the creation
and maintenance of an actual order of positive laws which preserves and embodies the more
general principle of normative order” … . The third requires that “the relationship between the
state and the individual … be regulated by law” … . So understood, it is difficult to conceive of
how the rule of law could be used as a basis for invalidating legislation … (ibid at paras 58-59).
[…]

50.

[The appellants] submit that the rule of law requires that legislation: (1) be prospective; (2)
be general in character; (3) not confer special privileges on the government, except where
necessary for effective governance; and (4) ensure a fair civil trial. And they argue that the
Act breaches each of these requirements, rendering it invalid. A brief review of this Court’s
jurisprudence will reveal that none of these requirements enjoy constitutional protection in
Canada (ibid at paras 63-64).

Dyzenhaus, “Schmitt v Dicey,” supra note 12 at 2018. Dyzenhaus states that:

A grey hole is a legal space in which there are some legal constraints on executive action—it
is not a lawless void—but the constraints are so insubstantial that they pretty well permit
government to do as it pleases. And since such grey holes permit government to have its cake
and eat it too, to seem to be governing not only by law but in accordance with the rule of law,
they and their endorsement by judges and academics might be even more dangerous from the
perspective of the substantive conception of the rule of law than true black holes.
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Finally, there is one other matter on which Stacey and I concur. Some in the
‘reform’ camp recommend that independent experts should make environmental
decisions. Stacey condemns this idea, and rightly so. It is at odds with rule of
law norms51 and would increase rather than diminish the role of unaccountable
discretion in environmental law.

III. CONCLUSION
The imperative to manage environmental conditions comes not from the nature
of ecosystems but from the ethos of the administrative state. Variability and
unpredictability in ecosystems are obstacles to management, and that must seem
like an emergency to those who are committed to fashioning the most “desirable”
environmental outcomes. But that does not mean that ecosystems actually exist
in a state of emergency.
Environmental issues are conflicts between people. Legal rules tell people
how those conflicts will be resolved. Law governs the behaviour of people; it
cannot control the behaviour of ecosystems or the actions of butterflies and
beetles. It can govern only the actions of foresters in response to the beetles.
Should foresters chop down dead trees? Because ecosystems, like markets, are
systems of interactions, the role of the state should be limited to setting generally
applicable rules for the behaviour of people as they interact in those systems and
then letting the systems run.
The rule of law is inconvenient. It gets in the way of officials crafting
solutions to problems they perceive as important. That is not its downside but
its purpose. If the modern administrative state is incompatible with a formal
conception of the rule of law, then it is the modern administrative state that
must adapt. If the choice was between environmental decline and a dictatorial
executive, better that the country go to hell in a hand basket than be subject to
the permanent tyranny of unfettered discretion. Fortunately, those are not the
options. Environmental protection and the rule of law do not push in opposite
directions. Instead, it is the loss of the rule of law that allows governments to pick
and choose the environmental conditions that they wish to alternatively save and
sacrifice. Boundless authority to respond to “environmental emergency” is an
unbearable licence to make things up on the go.
51.

See Friedrich A Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944) at
55. Hayek writes, “[T]here could hardly be a more unbearable—and more irrational—world
than one in which the most eminent specialists in each field were allowed to proceed
unchecked with the realization of their ideals.”

